If you go back to Plato, you can consider Form to be your aspect or facet - the abstracted ‘thing’ - and Matter to be its concrete equivalent.
The problem of universals – how can one thing in general be many things in particular – was solved by presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused plural representations of itself in particular objects.
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The theory of matter and form (today's hylomorphism) started with Plato and possibly germinal in some of the presocratic writings. The forms were considered as being "in" something else, which Plato called nature (physis). The latter seemed as carved "wood", ὕλη (hyle) in Greek, corresponding to materia in Latin, from which the English word "matter" is derived, shaped by receiving (or exchanging) forms.
- Wikipedia
In your example, you could say:
- If "A is an Aspect of B", then "B is a materialisation of A".
To use Jim’s example: if furriness is an aspect of dog, then dog is a materialisation of furriness.
Alternatively, if you use the earlier portion of the quote above, taking the aspect as the “one thing in general”, then each of the “many things in particular” can be called an instance:
If "A is an Aspect of B", then "B is a instance of A".
For example, the generic table is an aspect of an IKEA table, and an IKEA table is an instance of the generic table.