Consider the following phrase:
The airplane is missing its wings
Given that wings are part of the definition of an airplane, why is it correct to use “the airplane” to refer to an airplane without wings?
Consider the following phrase:
The airplane is missing its wings
Given that wings are part of the definition of an airplane, why is it correct to use “the airplane” to refer to an airplane without wings?
I'm not sure whether this is a profound (or maybe willfully obtuse?) question about semiotics and the nature of being, or a very simple but confused question about articles. You seem to assume a relationship between "definite article" and "definition." If your question is "At what point does an airplane become not-an-airplane," that's a philosophical question, not on-topic here. (And surely wings are only a part of the definition, and by any reasonable construction it is still "an airplane." Amputees might object to any sophistry that considers them non-human.)
But that's irrelevant, since the signifier "the airplane" can refer backwards to an earlier identification. Barring an in media res situation, the definite article usually refers to an entity already under discussion. Consider this example:
The witch picked up a frog and dripped a drop of potion on it. There was a puff of smoke, and when it cleared, the frog had become a bird.
First of all, notice that the first introduction of the frog uses the indefinite article. But in the second sentence, even though the frog was entirely no longer a frog, we can meaningfully refer to it as "the frog" as a shorthand for "the entity recently identified as a frog and under immediate discussion."
Given that wings are part of the definition of an airplane, why is it correct to use “the airplane” to refer to an airplane without wings?
You have not shown that the given assumption is a necessary assumption, or that words rely on rigid definitions. Other answers have tried to show that the mental space is flexible.
I am not very well read in semantics (which is a topic in philosophy for sure, but not exclusively so, and obviously topical in linguistics and any given language), so it may be misleading to point out Relations between Objects and Memory (2011, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, Ed. Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt) with relevant articles.
Renate Bartsch, Concept formation, memory and Understanding:
This article presents an alternative to the traditional notion of concepts and their assumed functions in descriptions and understanding, developed in Bartsch (1998) and Bartsch (2002), will function in developing an alternative to the traditional thinking about memory as a huge library or set of ready-made images or (propositional) representations of past events. [...]
It is a "recapitulation" of Bartsch (2005, preview).
This is flanked by Novak and Lamb, Nouns and verbs in the mental lexicon, Garnham and Cowles, Mental models and noun-phrase anaphora, and more, with many further references (eg. to Frege, who is well known as Philosopher).
This should imply, at least, that questions such as yours are hot research topics for a while now, especially as neurology is gaining ground.
It is also directly relatable, if "The airplane" is an anaphora, as was circumscribed in one comment.
[...] the signifier "the airplane" can refer backwards to an earlier identification. [@AndyBonner]
This is not quite cutting it. Garnham and Cowles show convincingly (ie. I did not believe it but found myself doing it) that "[...] the use of what is naturally analyzed as an anaphoric expression occurs without a linguistic antecedent, or at least without a linguistic antecedent with the same meaning.":
(1) John used to dream a lot, but he never remembered them.
Just as you argue about definitions, they concede that "A standard antecedent for a definite pronoun such as them would refer to the same thing (or set of things) as the pronouns, for example in (2)."
(2) John used to have a lot of dreams, but he never remembered them.
In their conclusion, there are at least two points that are relevant to our question. Identity of reference anaphora refers to an entity that has been introduced explicitly or implicitly. Anaphora by direct repition of the noun-phrase originally used to introduce the entity is relatively rare and can often sound infelicitous. I.e. * The airplane has lost the airplane's wings. They admit that there is no general concensus how this is to be explained and that, for complex texts, focusing is relatively complex phenomenon, and that its operation is not fully understood.