EDITED
With reference to the original question, I can't see how terms specific to computer language are relevant.
There are terms used to describe aspects of general language use which go back to Aristotle's 10 categories of being, as laid out within what's now known as his 'Organon'.
The question relates to the classification of the relationship between the terms 'Jeff Attwood', 'Jeff Attwood's hair' and 'the colour of Jeff Attwood's hair'.
In terms of Aristotle's categories, 'Jeff Attwood', 'Jeff Attwood's hair', and 'the colour of Jeff Attwood's hair' would all come under 'Substance'.
I would classify 'Jeff Attwood's hirsuteness' under 'Quality', as an attribute which relates to 'Jeff Attwood'.
Furthermore, I would put 'black' under 'Quality' as an attribute which relates to 'Jeff Attwood's hair'.
In the sentence 'Jeff Attwood has black hair', in terms of the Categories, 'hair' is treated (unclearly) as an attribute of 'Jeff Attwood' and 'black' is treated as described in the previous sentence, becoming an attribute of an attribute.
For a breakdown on the categories, see the Wikipedia link previously cited or my TEDx talk on the importance of linking words to meaning through them here.
I trust this makes things clearer for those unfamiliar with this terminology and shows its greater relevance than computer programming terminology in this context.
ORIGINAL
From the integrated traditional liberal arts tradition within which I work, there is a link between subject and predicate in a sentence and substance and attribute with reference to Aristotle's 10 categories of being.
The 9 attributes (excluding substance) encompass more than properties might - for instance, two of the categories relate to the substance's position with regards to space and time. Are these, strictly speaking, properties? 'Having' is one of the attributes/categories, and there is no confusion here, as there would be with 'property' used in two conflicting senses - association, or ownership.
It is a sad case of the decline in the teaching of English that this distinction has been forgotten. You can, of course, treat 'property' as synonymous with 'attribute'. The question is why. Since Aristotle's categories are embodied and express different modes of the way in which we think, I can't see how they can be separated from language.